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THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN EXTRADITION
TAKES A WRONG TURN IN LIGHT OF THE
FUGITIVE DISENTITLEMENT DOCTRINE:
NINTH CIRCUIT VACATES THE
REQUIREMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR A PROVISIONAL ARREST IN
PARRETTI V. UNITED STATES'

INTRODUCTION

Did you know that it is possible for an American citizen to be arrested within the United States based on a warrant without a showing
of probable cause? Did you know that it is also possible for an American citizen to be held in prison for a limitless period of time without
bail? In 1986, Robert Henry Russell, a citizen of the United States,
was arrested because the Colombian government charged him with
fraud. 2 A United States Attorney of the Southern District of Texas,
acting on behalf of the Colombian government, filed a complaint that
alleged he had information and belief that Mr. Russell had violated
certain sections of the Colombian penal code. 3 A United States Magistrate issued a warrant for Mr. Russell's provisional arrest based upon
the information contained in the complaint. 4 Mr. Russell remained in
custody for two months before his claims were finally addressed by
the court for the first time. 5 Mr. Russell subsequently claimed that the
court erred in denying his request for bail and in granting his provi6
sional arrest without a showing of probable cause.
1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard arguments for Parrettiv.
United States on November 21, 1995. See 112 F.3d 1363, 1363 (9th Cir. 1997). The case was
decided on May 6, 1997. See id. The Ninth Circuit then amended its opinion on August 29, 1997.
See 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). The facts recited in the amended version will be relied upon
throughout this Note. On December 18, 1997, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc heard
arguments. See 143 F.3d 508, 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The en banc panel issued its
decision on May 1, 1998. See id. The en banc opinion will also be discussed throughout this
Note.
2. See In the Matter of Extradition of Robert Henry Russell, 647 F. Supp. 1044, 1045
(U.S.S.D. Tex. 1986).
3. See id. at 1045.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1046.
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International extradition enables a government to request the return of a United States citizen who has committed a crime within its
borders but has fled to another country. 7 Extradition also allows a
government to provisionally arrest an American before a formal extradition hearing occurs. 8 The provisional arrest results in the detention of an American for a specified period of time while the
requesting government gathers information for a formal hearing. 9
Unfortunately, the provisional arrest warrant can be obtained without
a showing of probable cause, contrary to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' 0 As a result,
Americans can be detained in prison while they await a formal extradition hearing without the protections that are normally afforded to
them.
The United States government justifies this type of detention with
two reasons. First, it argues that the ability to enforce and maintain an
extradition treaty with a foreign country depends upon the ability to
capture a defendant who is a flight risk." According to the government, this is more important than the legal provisions that are expected to protect the interests and rights of its own citizens.1 2 Second,
the government contends that a showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest is statutorily required. 13 However, the relevant statute,
18 U.S.C. § 3184, has been interpreted to require probable cause only
for a formal extradition hearing.' 4 Therefore, a showing of probable
cause is not required for a provisional arrest warrant unless it is specifically mandated by the language of the applicable treaty.
The judiciary has, on occasion, interpreted the language of various
extradition treaties to require probable cause for the issuance of a
provisional arrest warrant.1 5 Usually, the legislature simply revises
the treaty to exclude any language that may indicate a requirement for
7. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rienhardt, J., concurring).
8. See id. at 785 n.5 (citing United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1996)).
9. See id.
10. U.S. CONsTl. amend. IV ("[Nlo [search] Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
11. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 771-73.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 772.
14. See M.

CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL

EXTRADITION:

UNITED STATES

LAW AND

686 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION].
15. See, e.g., Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988) (interpreting extradition
treaty between the United States and Spain); United States v. Russell, 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir.
1986) (interpreting extradition treaty between the United States and the Republic of Columbia);
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting extradition treaty between the
United States and Italy).
PRACTICE
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probable cause. 16 Thus, the judiciary's proactive interpretation of an
extradition treaty fails to rectify the situation because there remains
no bright line rule as to what is required for a provisional arrest. As a
result, neither the applicable extradition treaty nor § 3184 ensures that
probable cause will be required for a provisional arrest.
Parretti v. United States represents the first time that a court addressed the issue of a provisional arrest in light of the Fourth Amendment. In Parretti,the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment
required a showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest warrant. 17 It also held that a denial of bail absent a risk of flight violated
the Fifth Amendment because no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 18 However, one year
later the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc vacated these holdings and dismissed Parretti's appeal. 19
Under the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, which allows the judiciary to dismiss the appeal of a defendant when he or she becomes a
fugitive, the Ninth Circuit vacated its holding. 20 The court acted without discretion and lost sight of the importance of the constitutional
issues involved. As a result, the law of extradition remains unsettled
as to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a provisional arrest,
and thereby fails to protect a United States citizen from the burden of
detention without a showing of probable cause. As mentioned,
neither treaty language nor § 3184 provides the requirement of probable cause for a provisional arrest warrant. Thus, citizens may be subjected to arrest without the protection that is afforded by the United
States Constitution.
Part I of this Note provides a general background of the development and purpose of extradition law. 21 It also offers a description of
and rationale for the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and shows how
courts have applied the doctrine. 22 Next, Part I presents the purpose
and effects of a provisional arrest. 23 Finally, it discusses the ramifications of the special circumstances doctrine in light of the issue of
16. See Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 744. See generally Treaty on Extradition, Sept. 24, 1984, U.S.Italy, art. XIII, T.I.A.S. No. 10,837.
17. See 122 F.3d at 773.
18. See id. at 781; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
).
19. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
20. See id. at 511.
21. See infra notes 31-72 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 105-190 and accompanying text.
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bail. 24 Part II discusses in detail the facts and procedural history of
the 1998 en banc decision in Parretti v. United States. 2 5 It also describes the rationale of the majority and dissenting opinions. 26 Part
III critically analyzes this decision in light of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. 27 Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit made a significant policy mistake by applying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine
and vacating its 1997 panel opinion.2 8 Finally, Part IV addresses the
impact of the en banc opinion. 29 More specifically, Part IV discusses
the ramifications of leaving the constitutional issues of probable cause
and bail in the context of extradition law unresolved. Part IV also
explores the future impact of extradition law upon the lives of United
States citizens. Part V concludes that the lack of guidance in the area
30
of extradition will create further injustices.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

InternationalExtradition: Development and Purpose

International extradition is a process that enables independent sovereigns to provide assistance to one other in criminal matters. 3' Usually, a state may render assistance to another state by surrendering "a
person sought as an accused criminal or fugitive offender. ' 32 However, extradition was not always used for the surrender of common
criminals. In fact, the evolution of extradition can be traced through
four periods. 33 During each period, the type of criminal subject to
extradition changed in order to meet the demands of the requesting
state.
Initially, states used extradition as a tool to obtain the control of
escaped political or religious figures. 34 Then, in the late eighteenth
century, the scope of extradition shifted to capture military offend24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 191-226
infra notes 227-270
infra notes 271-303
infra notes 309-367
infra notes 368-398
infra notes 399-406
infra Part V.

and
and
and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
text.

GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 17 (1991).
32. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 1.
33. See id. at 3. From ancient times to the seventeenth century the concern for political and
religious offenders dominated extradition. See id. The focus shifted from the eighteenth century

to the mid-nineteenth century, when treaty-making was mainly concerned with military offenders. See id. Then, from 1833 to 1948 there was a general interest in the prevention of common
criminality. See id. Finally, from 1948 to the present the concentration has been on international
due process and human rights. See id. at 3-4.
34. See id. at 3.
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ers.35 Now extradition has expanded to meet the demands of modern
travel. Due to the ease of travel, most criminals possess the ability to
flee the location of their crimes. 36 As a result, states have entered into
agreements of "international co-operation" 37 in order to prevent all
types of criminals from obtaining refuge in foreign lands.
The purpose of extradition is not to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. 38 Rather, extradition requires a requested state
to determine the answers to two independent questions. First, the requested state must determine if there is a reasonable cause to believe
that a defendant has committed the crime of which he or she is accused. 39 Second, the requested state must be convinced that the accused should be extradited from its jurisdiction in order to stand trial
in the requesting state. 40 However, before the process of extradition
can begin, the United States must have a duty to extradite at the request of another state. This duty is established through an interna41
tional treaty between the United States and the requesting state.
1.

International Extradition: United States Treaty Development

The United States government is based on a system of checks and
balances. 42 The Framers of the Constitution vested the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches of government with different responsibilities in an effort to balance their power. 43 The United States
also adheres to these principles of government in the international extradition process. Each level of the federal government has the ability
to review the actions of its counterparts in every phase of the extradi44
tion process.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. GILBERT, supra note 31, at 17.

38. See id. at 6.
39. See Ex Parte Sternaman, 77 F. 595, 596-97 (N.D.NY. 1896); see also BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 1-2 ("The surrender of a person who has been granted

the privilege of presence or refuge in the requested state has always been deemed an exceptional
measure running against the traditions of asylum and the hospitality of the requesting state.").
40. See Sternaman, 77 F. at 596-97.
41. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 50-51.
42. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. Article I says, "[aill legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Article II states, "[tlhe executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1. Article III
reads, "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1.
43. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1,11, 111.
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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In the United States, an applicable treaty is required to establish a
duty to extradite internationally. 45 According to the Constitution, the
power to develop and enter into a treaty with another sovereign rests
solely with the Executive branch. 46 Congress then provides a twofold
review process of that treaty. First, the House of Representatives may
enact legislation to limit the scope of the treaty.47 Second, the Senate,
through its power of advice and consent, may approve the treaty "provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. '48 The judiciary,
however, "cannot enjoin, prohibit or mandate" the Executive branch
from negotiating a treaty or refusing to extradite an accused. 49 These
limitations are compensated by the judiciary's power to deny the extradition of an accused "if the extradition is in violation of the Consti'50
tution, U.S. Laws, or the applicable treaty.
2.

Bilateral Treaties: The Inherent Difficulties

The use and enforcement of bilateral treaties in the international
extradition process has been the policy of the United States since the
beginning of the twentieth century.5' "Bilateral treaties make for a
piecemeal approach to extradition practice, given that some differences will arise during each set of negotiations, but the agreement will
be best suited to the two parties' particular situation. '52 A bilateral
treaty may be analyzed in "contractual terms" 53 because the treaty is
required to bind the respective countries in mutual extradition. One
of the effects of a bilateral treaty is its tendency to promote the idea of
45. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 6-11 (1936) (requiring that the United States
only extradite those within its territory if pursuant to a treaty between the United States and the
requesting State); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (same); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-20 (1886) (same). 18 U.S.C. § 3184 states:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and
any foreign government .... any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States... may, upon complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction . . . issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the person so charged ....
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).

46. See U.S. CONsr. art. I1, § 2.
47. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 33.

48. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
49. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 34.
50. Id.

51. See id. at 50 (citing WHITEMAN DIGEsT 732-37; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 476; International Proceduresfor the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, 1980 PROC. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 277); see also GILBERT, supra note 31, at 17 ("Extradition is usually effected by
way of bilateral treaties, most of which, unfortunately were concluded around the turn of the
century.").
52. GILBERT, supra note 31, at 20.
53. Id. at 8.
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reciprocity. 54 For example, a requested State often agrees to extradite
the accused based on its belief that at some point in time its own request will also be honored.
Due to the reliance upon bilateral treaties, conflicts have arisen between the law of the United States and treaty provisions. As a result,
the judiciary must review extradition on a case-by-case basis to resolve the discrepancies between the Constitution, other United States
laws, and the applicable treaty. According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, a
scholar of international extradition:
The problem with this approach is that it does not provide for uniformity and consistency in the extradition law and practice of the
United States. In addition, it creates different jurisprudence for different treaties, thus creating a disparity in the law and practice of
extradition depending upon which treaty is applicable at the time
and also depending upon how different circuits will interpret certain
requirements for extradition. This situation makes it more difficult
to ascertain the precedental value of55decisions interpreting a given
treaty with respect to other treaties.
As a result, international extradition lacks the uniformity enjoyed in
domestic extradition. For example, during domestic interstate extradition, the Constitution requires courts to give full faith and credit to
the judicial process of the requesting state. 56 This requirement is
based on the belief that the judicial proceedings of every domestic
state comply with elements of the Constitution. 57 Therefore, the judiciary is able to develop reliable precedent for all fifty states to follow
during domestic interstate extradition. However, in matters of international extradition, the Executive branch creates treaties with foreign countries that are separate and distinct from each other. 58
Furthermore, each treaty possesses its own provisions and rules that
must be interpreted by the judiciary in light of the Constitution and
other relevant statutes. 59 Consequently, an analysis of each treaty on
54. See id. at 17. Gilbert stresses that reciprocity may not always be necessary for a bilateral
treaty because some states will simply want to dispose of criminals within their borders rather
than require reciprocity. See id.
55. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 47.
56. The Constitution states:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority
of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
57. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290 (1978).
58. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 47.
59. See id.
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a case-by-case basis creates instability in extradition law and fails to
develop clear precedent for all branches of government to follow.
3.

60

InternationalExtradition: The Reduction in Protection

Historically, in international extradition cases, courts have failed to
offer the procedural safeguards provided to criminal defendants. This

has been attributed to the rationale that extradition is a process that
does not determine the guilt or innocence of a fugitive. For example,
in United States v. Galanis,6 1 the court held that an extradition proceeding was not the same as a criminal prosecution. 62 More specifi-

cally, the court held that pursuant to a valid treaty, a defendant should
63
not receive the constitutional protections offered at a criminal trial.
In Jhirad v. Ferrandina,64 the court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial did not apply to international extradition. 65 According to the court, international extradition was a
unique proceeding unlike a domestic criminal proceeding. 66 The court
stated that orders of extradition "embody no judgment on the guilt or
innocence of the accused but serve only to insure that his culpability
''6 7
will be determined in another and, in this instance, a foreign forum.

In another example, Neely v. Henkel,68 the Supreme Court held that
the protections of the Constitution did not apply to an American facing trial in a foreign land. 69 The Court reasoned that the Constitution
did not offer protection for a crime committed in a foreign jurisdiction
70
and under foreign laws.

60. See United States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 833 No. 16,175 (D.S.C. 1799) (noting that in
the absence of any provision in the treaty in respect to which department of the government
shall execute the provisions relating to extradition, the third article of the Constitution declares
that the judicial power shall extend to treaties); see also United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733,
737 (1979) (stating that interpreting treaties is a judicial process).
61. 429 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).
62. See id.at 1224.
63. See id.
64. 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976).
65. See id. at 485 n.9.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 482. "[lit is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation. Such an assumption would
directly conflict with the principle of comity upon which extradition is based." Id. at 484-85.
68. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
69. See id. at 117-19.
70. See id.; see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 460-62 (1913) (holding that there is no
right to cross-examination); Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984) (confirming
that there is no right to discovery in foreign extradition).
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Parretti v. United States71 represented a step in the opposite direction. Through its panel opinion, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Constitution provided for some procedural safeguards in the extradition
process. It held that the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of
72
probable cause before a provisional arrest warrant may be issued.
However, the Ninth Circuit abandoned this procedural safeguard afforded by the Constitution due to the Fugitive Disentitlement
Doctrine.
B.

The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

According to Abney v. United States, 73 a defendant's ability to appeal a criminal conviction in a court of law is not an absolute right
provided by the United States Constitution. 74 In fact, the Court held
that the right to appeal is "a creature of statute. ' 75 However, the ability of a party to appeal an unfavorable decision should be distinguished from the procedural rules involved during the process of that
appeal. Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
a court with the ability to establish procedural rules through adjudication, as long as those rules are not inconsistent with any other existing
rule.

76

"These rules may be implemented and enforced by the appellate
courts provided that they are (1) not inconsistent with the Constitution or a statute; (2) within the authority of the courts to establish
through adjudication; and (3) reasonable in light of the interests they
seek to promote. ' 77 It is the practice of the Supreme Court to consistently "approve of a dismissal as an appropriate sanction when a prisoner becomes a fugitive during the 'ongoing appellate process.' "78
The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine allows a court to dismiss an appeal of a defendant who has fled the jurisdiction of the United
71. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997).
72. See id. at 767.
73. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
74. See id. at 656 (stating that there is no constitutional right to an appeal for a criminal
conviction).
75. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (creating the right to appeal a final decision from the district
court to an appellate court in the respective jurisdiction).
76. See FED. R. App. P. 47 ("[Tlhe courts of appeals may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent.").
77. Anthony Michael Altman, The Fugitive Dismissal Rule: Ortega-Rodriguez Takes the Bite
out of Flight, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (1995). See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145-48
(1985).
78. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242 (1993).
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States. 79 A court's power to dismiss a fugitive's claim is grounded in
equity. 80
1.

The Various Rationales of the Doctrine

As the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine evolved, several courts developed distinct rationales to support its use. This evolution began in
1879 with Smith v. United States. 8' In Smith, the Court justified its use

of the doctrine when it held that the convicted party must be present
in court to receive the judgment of the appeal.8 2 According to the
Court, it had the ability "to refuse to hear a criminal case in error,
unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made
to respond to any judgment we may render. '83 As a result, the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine enabled a court to dismiss an appeal
when a convicted party fled its jurisdiction because the court feared
that it would be unable to enforce its judgment.
Almost a century later, in Molinaro v. New Jersey,84 the Court justi-

fied the doctrine based on its belief that being a fugitive disentitled a
party from the benefits of an appeal.8 5 The Court held that "escape
does not strip the case of its character as an adjuticable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources
of the court for determination of his claims."' 86 Other rationales developed by courts for the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine include

the encouragement of surrender, the discouragement of escape, and
the promotion of the dignified operation of the courts. 87

79. See id. at 234; see also Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 541-42 (1975).
80. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681
Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 1990).
81. 94 U.S. 97 (1879).

n.2 (1985); United States v. Van

82. See id. at 97.
83. /d. See, e.g., Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (stating that where the accused escapes while a writ of error is pending, the case will be stricken from the docket unless he
is brought within the jurisdiction of the court below on or before the last day of the term). See
also Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897) (affirming Smith and Bonahan).
84. 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
85. See id.
86. Id. at 366. See, e.g., Hussein v. INS, 817 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the defendant
was disentitled from the resources of the court when he escaped from federal custody). It should
also be noted that Judge Norris' concurrence stated that there is not a per se requirement to such
a dismissal. See id. at 63 (Norris, J., concurring).
87. See, e.g., Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975) (affirming a statute that required a
defendant's appeal to be dismissed if the defendant escaped during the pending appeal because
then the court would be unable to enforce its judgment).
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2.

Which Jurisdiction'sDignity Should the Doctrine Protect?

Some circuits tried to expand the use of the Fugitive Disentitlement
Doctrine to encompass all stages of the appellate process. 88 However,
the Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States overruled
these attempts. 89 The defendant in Ortega-Rodriguez fled while his
sentencing was pending but was recaptured before his appeal occurred. 90 In its decision, the Court focused on the connection between
the defendant's status as a fugitive and the appellate process. 9' As a
result, the Supreme Court determined that the defendant did not disrespect the appellate court, but rather "flouted the authority of the
district court. ' 92 Therefore, it was the district court that held the authority to defend its dignity and penalize the defendant. 93 The Court
further stated:
We cannot accept an expansion of this reasoning that would allow
an appellate court to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system, even where
such conduct has no connection to the course of appellate proceedings. Such a rule would sweep far too broadly. ....94
Thus, the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine is a tool for the specific
jurisdiction from which the fugitive has fled and thus disrespected to
protect its dignity. It is not a tool to protect the dignity of the entire
judiciary.
3. Act of Discretion Before Applying Fugitive Disentitlement
Recently, the enforcement of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine
has been highlighted by the judiciary's use of discretion. Discretion is
normally based on the importance of the issue presented and the rela88. See, e.g., United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
fugitive's flight during trial was not different from his or her flight after conviction but before
sentencing); United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[A] defendant who
flees after conviction, but before sentencing, waives his right to appeal from the conviction unless he can establish that his absence was due to matters completely beyond his control.").
89. See 507 U.S. 234, 249 (1993).
90. See id. at 246.
91. See id. at 249.
92. Id. at 245-46.
93. See id.; see also United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1988) (failing to apply the
reasoning of Holmes because the defendant's "misconduct was in the district court, and should
affect consequences in that court").
94. Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246. The Court offered an example of the sweeping nature
of the rule developed in Holmes when it stated that it would be permitted to "dismiss a petition
solely because the petitioner absconded for a day during district court proceedings, or even because the petitioner once violated a condition of parole or probation." Id.
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tionship between the defendant's escape and the appellate process. 9 5
For example, in Degen v. United States,96 the Supreme Court overruled the application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in order
to prevent the lower court's excessive use of power. 97
Also, there is no per se rule that an appellate court must dismiss an
appeal based on escape. 98 More specifically, in United States v. Van
Cauwenberghe,99 the court did not solely focus upon the escape of the
defendant.1 0 0 Rather, the court employed a "totality of circumstances"'' ° approach to the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, under
which escape was just one of the factors to be considered. Furthermore, in United States v. Veliotis, 02 the court added another factor
that should be considered before using the Fugitive Disentitlement
Doctrine.1 03 The court specifically stated that "where a fugitive defendant seeks to vindicate a right vouchsafed by the United States
Constitution, the court should give weight to this factor in determining
'0 4
how to exercise its discretion."'
C.

ProvisionalArrest

Throughout history, the process of extradition has enabled the government to obtain a provisional arrest warrant before a formal hearing has occurred. 05 A provisional arrest has been defined as "a
temporary arrest made prior to, and in contemplation of an extradition request, pursuant to a treaty which authorizes it and for the lim95. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 n.2 (1985) (deciding the case on the merits
rather than dismissing); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 194 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(concluding in the dissent that the court should exercise discretion when contemplating dismissal
in light of the importance of the issue presented).
96. 517 U.S. 820 (1996).
97. See id. at 829. The court further stated that "the sanction of disentitlement is most severe
and so could disserve the dignitary purposes for which it is invoked." Id. at 828. But see Estelle
v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 544 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating in the dissent that punishment by appellate dismissal introduces an element of arbitrariness and irrationality into sentencing for escape).
98. See Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1990); Hussien v. INS, 817 F.2d
63, 63 (9th Cir. 1986).
99. 934 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1990).
100. See id. at 1054.
101. Id.
102. 586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
103. See id. at 1514.
104. Id. at 1515. See, e.g., United States v. Tunnell, 650 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a dismissal of an appeal where a conviction may have been based on an unconstitutional
presumption was unjustified); United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that the defendant's failure to object to a jury instruction before her conviction did not
preclude the point for appeal).
105. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 675.
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ited period of time provided for in the treaty. The arrest is made
pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate.' ' 10 6 The primary purpose of a provisional arrest is to secure an individual while
the requesting state gathers and transmits the necessary documents
for formal extradition. 10 7 It is the policy of the United States to grant
a provisional arrest if there is reason to believe that the individual will
flee before the formal extradition process takes place. 10 8
1.

Two Underlying Conditions: Urgency and Probable Cause

Generally, two substantive conditions are required for a provisional
arrest warrant-urgency and probable cause. Urgency is a question of
fact that is contemplated by a court in light of any credible evidence. 10 9 It is based upon the nature of the crime charged and the
personality of the accused, such as whether he or she is likely to flee
the jurisdiction. 0 For example, a court is more likely to find urgency
in a situation in which a suspect is accused of murder rather than a
suspect charged with fraud. However, when practically applied, the
element of urgency is usually ignored or satisfied by a simple allegation of the requesting state."'
Probable cause, a constitutional requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is "[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items
connected with a crime."" 2 Before the 1997 Parrettipanel decision,
the Fourth Amendment had never been applied to a provisional
arrest. Usually, when an accused claimed that his or her provisional
arrest lacked a requirement of probable cause, the government would
argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 already required probable cause for a provisional arrest." 3 Therefore, the government argued that the Fourth
Amendment was not necessary to determine the issue of probable
106. Id.
107. See id. at 677; see also GILBERT, supra note 31, at 37 (quoting Government of the F.R.G.
v Sotiriardis, [1975] AC 1 at 25C and G-H) ("[A] provisional warrant provides for '... the
precautionary arrest of the fugitive criminal to prevent him from fleeing the country before the
requisition for his surrender has been received by the Secretary of State.'").
108. See BASSlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 677. According to Bassiouni, there are three elements to justify a provisional arrest. First, there must be "a condition
of emergency or urgency or some type of exigent circumstances." Id. Second, the provisional
arrest warrant must be based "basically [on] the same substantial ground as would authorize the
issuance of a warrant by a United States court for the crime charged." Id. Third, any other
elements required by the applicable treaty or extradition law must be satisfied. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (7th ed. 1999).
113. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 47.
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cause. Consequently, many uncertainties have developed throughout
the evolution of extradition law concerning the Fourth Amendment
and its relation to relevant treaty provisions.14
2.

Early Determinationsof Probable Cause for a ProvisionalArrest

Despite the failure to apply the Fourth Amendment, some early
cases implicitly addressed the determination of probable cause for a
provisional arrest. These early cases resulted in decisions that conflicted as to the amount of evidence required for a provisional arrest
warrant. In 1896, the court in Ex parte Sternaman 1 5 outlined the requirements of a sufficient government complaint that would establish
probable cause for a provisional arrest.1 16 The court favored a less
technical practice of drafting a complaint when it declared:
The complaint should set forth clearly and briefly the offense
charged. It need not be drawn with the formal precision of an indictment. If it be sufficiently explicit to inform the accused person
of the precise nature of the charge against him it is sufficient. The
extreme technicality with which these proceedings were formerly
conducted has given place to a more liberal practice, the object being to reach a correct decision upon the main question-is there
reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been committed? The
complaint
may, in some instances, be upon information and
17
belief.
In Sternaman, the requesting state's representative lacked personal
knowledge about the crime in issue.t1s Despite the representative's
lack of personal knowledge, the court held that the government's
complaint was sufficient to authorize a provisional arrest warrant. 119
According to the court, a complaint is sufficient to warrant action if
the offense is an extraditable crime defined by the treaty and the complaint "clearly and explicitly" 120 explains the nature of the crime to
1 21
the defendant.
Five years later, the Supreme Court in Rice v. Ames122 did not endorse the full rationale of Sternaman.123 The Court did support the
premise that allowed a representative without personal knowledge of
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77 F. 595 (N.D.N.Y. 1896).
See id. at 596-97.
Id.
See id. at 597-98.
See id. at 598.
Id. at 597.
See Sternaman, 77 F. at 597.
180 U.S. 371 (1901).
See id. at 374.
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124
the crime to submit a complaint sworn on information and belief.
However, unlike Sternaman, the Court required that a complaint
based upon information and belief be supplemented with other
sources of evidence.1 25 More specifically, the Court declared that an
officer without personal knowledge
may with entire propriety make the complaint upon information
and belief, stating the sources of his information and the grounds of
his belief, and annexing to the complaint a properly certified copy
of any indictment or equivalent proceeding, which may have been
found in the foreign country, or a copy of the depositions of witof the facts, taken under the treaty
nesses having actual 1knowledge
26
and act of Congress.

Consequently, the Court held that certain counts of the complaint
were insufficient because the foreign representative failed to identify
the sources of information. 27 As a result, the Supreme Court developed a more challenging standard for a complaint requesting a provisional arrest. It declared that a complaint may be submitted when
based upon information and belief, but that the court must be informed of other sources. 128 "This will afford ample authority to the
'129
commissioner for issuing the warrant.
One year later, in Grin v. Shine,130 the Supreme Court acknowledged that foreign countries were not completely aware of United
States criminal procedure.13 1 Therefore, the Court adjusted and reduced the requirements of a complaint submitted for a provisional
arrest. In its opinion the Court stated:
[W]here the proceeding is manifestly taken in good faith, a technical
noncompliance with some formality of criminal procedure should
not be allowed to stand in the way of a faithful discharge of our
obligations ....
All that is required by § 5270 is that a complaint shall be made
under oath. It may be made by any person acting under the authority of the 1foreign
government . . . based upon depositions in his
32
possession.
124. See id. at 375.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 375-76. The court also added a disclaimer to its opinion by stating that it did not
want "to be understood as holding that, in extradition proceedings, the complaint must be sworn
to by persons having actual knowledge of the offense charged. This would defeat the whole
object of the treaty." Id. at 375.
127. See id. at 374.
128. See Rice, 180 U.S. at 375.
129. Id. at 376.
130. 187 U.S. 181 (1902).
131. See id. at 184-85.
132. Id. at 185, 193.
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The significant difference between the Grin and Rice opinions was
the requirement of supplemental evidence. The Court in Grin did not
specify whether the depositions were to be sent directly to the judge
or if it was sufficient for the representative to inform the judge of their
presence. 133 Despite this ambiguity, the Court nonetheless failed to
recognize a standard of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause
for a provisional arrest. 134 More specifically, the holding in Grin required less evidence than that required by Rice.
Once again in 1909, the Supreme Court reduced the requirements
of a complaint that requested a provisional arrest. In Yordi v.
Nolte,135 the requesting representative, a Mexican authority, based his
complaint solely upon information and belief. 36 He had neither personal nor actual knowledge of the defendant's offense. However, at
the time the complaint was drafted, he did have witness depositions
and a copy of the Mexican proceedings at his disposal. 137 The defendant claimed that the Mexican government should have either attached
its record to the complaint or disclosed on the face of the complaint
the sources of its information.138 The Court, however, disagreed and
held that the provisional arrest was not invalidated simply because the
Mexican records and depositions were not attached to the complaint. 3 9 The Court stated that "it was not indispensable to the jurisdiction of the commissioner that the record and depositions from
Mexico should be actually fastened to the complaint."'1 40 As a result,
the Supreme Court came full circle and endorsed the rationale of
Sternaman,'4 1 which was the least restrictive holding governing the
provisional arrest.
After Yordi, two decisions also implicitly reduced the standard of
probable cause required for a provisional arrest warrant. First, the
Court in Glucksman v. Henke' 42 stated that "[t]he complaint is sworn
to upon information and belief, but it is supported by the testimony of
witnesses who are stated to have been deposed, and whom, therefore,
133. See id. at 185.
134. See id.

135. 215 U.S. 227 (1909).
136. See id. at 228.
137. See id.

138. See id. at 229.
139. See id. at 230. The Court also stated the "the general doctrine in respect of extradition
complaints is well stated by Judge Coxe in Ex parte Sternaman .... " Id. It then proceeded to
repeat the logic of Sternaman. See 77 F. 595, 596-97 (N.D.N.Y. 1896).
140. Yordi, 215 U.S. at 230.
141. 77 F. at 596-97.
142. 221 U.S. 508 (1911).
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we must presume to have been sworn. That is enough. ' 143 Second, in
Fernandez v. Philips,14 4 the Court held that a complaint based upon
the information of a foreign government and issued by the Assistant
United States Attorney ("AUSA") is sufficient.1 45 The Court stated
that whether a complaint is sufficient does not depend upon the
knowledge of the AUSA as to the sufficiency of the facts presented by
146
the foreign government.
3.

The Modern Requirements of a ProvisionalArrest

Contrary to the confusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the modern requirements to obtain a provisional arrest warrant are extremely relaxed. Consequently, a complaint and warrant
application presented to a judge or magistrate supported by minimal
information will be approved.' 47 A request for a provisional arrest
goes through the Department of State and usually precedes the presentation of formal documents.' 48 The actual request for a provisional
arrest by a foreign government should include: (1) a description of the
fugitive; (2) an indication of the fugitive's exact location within the
requested state; (3) an enumeration of the treaty offense charged; (4)
a description of the circumstances of the crime including its date and
time; (5) the date of the issuance of a warrant or conviction by the
requesting government and the name of the judge and court that issued it; and (6) a description of the urgency involved in warranting a
49
provisional arrest.'
A request is accompanied by an affidavit from the AUSA. Within
the affidavit the AUSA swears to the following facts:
that (1) a telex, facsimile, or actual document was received from a
requesting state with which the United States has an extradition
treaty; (2) that the request is for the "provisional arrest" of a named
or identified person, whose presence is believed to be in the United
States; (3) that the request is based on a treaty offense ... ; (4) that
an arrest warrant was issued by a competent judicial authority in the
requesting state for that offense; and (5) that the requesting state
intends to submit a formal extradition request in accordance with
143. Id. at 518. This case adds more informality to the requirements for a provisional arrest
warrant because it assumes that the information presented was properly taken.
144. 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
145. See id. at 313.
146. See id.
147. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 792-93.
148. See id. at 792.
149. See id. at 793-94; see also UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL ch. 15, §§ 9-15.230 -915.231 (offering a sample form for requesting a provisional arrest).
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the requirements of the applicable treaty within the period of time
provided for in the treaty ....150
Although such documentation is required for a provisional arrest, the
courts have traditionally accepted far less.15 1 Normally, the affidavit
presented by the AUSA is simply based on the information received
from the police interpol or a facsimile.15 2 As a result, a judge or magistrate may issue an arrest warrant that is based on facsimile without
any verification or presentation of sources. 153 Therefore, it becomes
very difficult for a defendant to "effectively challenge the absence of
1 54
probable cause."
The statutory scheme of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 requires the presentation
of evidence to establish probable cause at a formal extradition hearing. However, it does not require probable cause for a provisional
arrest warrant. This is different than federal domestic cases where the
government is required to offer evidence in order to establish probable cause before an arrest warrant will be issued. 155 Furthermore, in
a domestic case, if an arrest occurs without a warrant, the judiciary
requires that a probable cause hearing be held promptly after the

150. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 682-83.
151. The usual process for a provisional arrest can be broken down into five steps. First, "the
arrest warrant must be issued by a judge or magistrate in the federal district where the person
sought is believed to be located; or, by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia" if
that person's location within the United States is unknown. Id. at 681. Second, the warrant's
legality rests within a treaty provision that specifically authorizes it. See id. Third, the warrant is
only valid for the specific period of time that is authorized in the treaty. See id. at 681. Fourth,
"It]he issuance of a warrant must be pursuant to a requesting state's submission to the United
States Government that it wants a given person detained pending preparation and/or presentation of a formal extradition request pursuant to a valid treaty between the requesting state and
the United States." Id. at 681-82. Fifth, probable cause should exist. See id. at 682.
152. See id. at 683.
153. See id.
154. Id. Moreover, there is no way to challenge the validity of the arrest warrant except on
constitutional grounds. See id. The establishment of probable cause typically occurs as follows:
[t]he principal supporting document that the Government will present in such cases is a
telex or a facsimile from the national Interpol office of the requesting state. That Interpol communication usually contains only scant information about the fact that an
arrest warrant is outstanding and that the person named is sought by the judicial or
police authority in the requesting state .... Interpol merely communicates these warrants through its liaison office which consists of national police officers assigned to
work in that capacity.
Id. at 683 (citing Mary Jo Grotenroth, Interpol's Role in International Law Enforcement, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL AsPEcrs 375, 376 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988)).
155. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (holding that a magistrate or judge may
issue a warrant if probable cause is established through the totality of the circumstances).
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arrest. 156 In contrast, when governments negotiate extradition treaties
they provide for longer periods of provisional arrest, usually between
forty and sixty days. 157 During negotiations it is believed that the
length of the provisional arrest is justified because government agencies and the judiciary are overworked and understaffed. 58 As a result, countries arrange for longer periods of detention during the
59
provisional arrest in order to ease the burden of these agencies.
This reduces the government's burden of establishing probable cause
in extradition cases because a country may request a provisional arrest
and provide evidence three months later at the formal extradition
hearing.1 60 Consequently, a defendant is held in prison without a de61
termination of the validity of his provisional arrest warrant. 1 Usually, when evidence is presented to establish probable cause at a
formal extradition hearing, the government contends that it is a moot
162
issue to rectify the lack of probable cause in the provisional arrest.
4.

Treaties May Require Probable Cause for the ProvisionalArrest

More recently, courts have become critical of the lack of probable
cause required for a provisional arrest warrant. The Second, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits have recognized that the probable cause established during a formal extradition hearing does not revert back to a
provisional arrest.' 6 3 These courts have held that a formal hearing
subsequently establishing probable cause does not render moot the
issue of the lack of probable cause upon the defendant's initial detention.' 64 Instead, each circuit looked to the language of the extradition
treaties to determine if probable cause was required for a provisional
arrest.1 65 According to judicial interpretation, each treaty required
156. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991) (holding that a prompt
hearing depends upon a number of factors including judicial resources, holidays, and the amount
of criminal activity). Generally, the reasonable amount of time is 48 hours. See id. at 56.
157. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 682 (citing Ivan Kavass
& A. Sprudzs, EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREATIES: UNITED STATES (2 vols. 1979 & Supp. 1989)).
158. See id. at 682.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 682-88.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 684.
163. See, e.g., Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that officials
obtained separate arrest warrant based on probable cause); United States v. Russell, 805 F.2d
1215 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that evidence at the provisional arrest stage could be informal);
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that further information was needed at
the extradition hearing to establish probable cause separate from the arrest warrant).
164. See Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 513-18; Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217; Caltagirone,629 F.2d at 74950.
165. See Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 518; Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 744.
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probable cause for a provisional arrest. 166 Unfortunately, the courts
were unable to address the applicability of the Fourth Amendment
because the treaties were interpreted to require probable cause.' 67
In Caltagirone v. Grant, an Italian national was provisionally arrested in the United States pursuant to a treaty between the United
States and Italy. 168 His provisional arrest warrant was issued without
probable cause and he was detained for forty-five days. 69 On appeal,
the Second Circuit held that the language of the treaty between the
United States and Italy clearly required a showing of probable cause
for a provisional arrest.' 70 "Accordingly, the provisional arrest provisions of American treaties fall into two groups: those with the informational requirement, and those without it."''71
The court also acknowledged the government's contention that
there must be differences between the provisional arrest and the formal extradition hearing. 172 However, the court reasoned that these
differences did "not lie in the requirement of probable cause."' 173 Fi166. See Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 513; Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 744.
167. See Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 513; Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 744.
168. See 629 F.2d at 742-43.
169. See id. at 743. To obtain the arrest warrant, the United States Attorney for the District of
New York simply completed a complaint under oath that alleged the existence of Italian warrants. See id. The United States Attorney made no showing of probable cause. See id.
170. See id. at 744. The court reasoned:
Article XIII of the Treaty provides that an application for provisional arrest must contain four elements: a description of the person sought; an indication of intent formally
to request the extradition of the person; an allegation that a warrant for the person's
arrest has been issued by the requesting state; and, finally, "such further information, if
any, as would be necessary to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense
been committed ... in the territory of the requested party. Since the "requested party"
in the instant case is the United States, the sufficiency of the information provided to
support Caltagirone's arrest must necessarily be judged by American law. . . . The
treaty does not contemplate a review of the validity under Italian law, of the Italian
arrest warrants, but rather a simple factual determination whether a warrant has been
issued. In this limited sense, deference to a foreign judicial determination is entirely
proper. It is quite another matter, however, to assert that the Republic of Italy's decision to apply for provisional arrest will be taken as an unreviewable determination that
the application conforms to all Treaty provisions. This is particularly true with respect
to the "further information" requirement, since we cannot suppose that the drafters
intended that an official of the requesting state would make a final determination of the
law of the requested party. We proceed, therefore, to the application of United States
standards for arrest and detention.
Id. (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 746.
172. See id. at 747.
173. Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 747. The court reasoned that the drafters of the treaty intended
the actual procedures of the provisional arrest and the extradition hearing to differ without sacrificing the protection of probable cause. See id. As a result, the provisional arrest procedure was
streamlined and not as formal. See id. "Article XI and Article XIII [of the treaty] both require a
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nally, the court addressed whether the defendant's appeal was
moot. 174 The government claimed that the new warrant granted by
the district judge, pursuant to Italy's formal request for extradition
under § 3184, superseded the provisional arrest warrant. 175 Despite
the government's contention, the court held that a "provisional arrest
warrant is capable of repetition.' ' 176 The court stated:
In view of the Government's persistent allegation .

.

. we do not

doubt that it will seek his rearrest under Article XIII should the
pending extradition complaint be denied. Under Article XIV of the
Treaty ... it enjoys the broad power to do so. Such rearrest would
almost certainly be pursuant to the provisional procedure ... for the

provisional request could be made immediately, by diplomatic telex,
1 77
without the substantial documentation required by Article XI.
Similarly, in Sahagian v. United States, 178 the Seventh Circuit
avoided the discussion of the Fourth Amendment and found that
probable cause was required by the language of the treaty.1 79 The
defendant was an American citizen residing in Spain. 180 The United
States Department of Justice requested the defendant's provisional
arrest pursuant to Article XI of the treaty between Spain and the
United States. 18' The court interpreted the treaty's language upon
"[s]uch further information, if any" as requiring probable cause for a
showing of probable cause, but the proceedings they contemplate are different in several crucial
respects." Id.
174. See id. at 749-50.
175. See id. at 749.
176. Id. The court specifically stated: "Caltagirone's provisional arrest is so clearly 'capable of
repetition, yet [evades] review,' that the controversy is alive and properly before us." Id. (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)).
177. Id. at 750. To summarize, the court rejected the government's claim that the appeal was
moot because the formal extradition request displaces the provisional warrant. See id. at 749-50.
The court reasoned that an appeal concerning a provisional arrest will continuously evade its
review under this theory. See id. at 749. It is also quite feasible to believe that defendants can be
subjected to a provisional arrest if the formal extradition is denied. See id. at 749-50; see also
Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1923) (holding that when an extradition hearing ends in
the defendant's release from custody, subsequent extradition demands are not barred).
178. 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).
179. See id. at 513.
180. See id. at 510.
181. See id. at 510-11. The defendant was charged with kidnapping his children. See id. at 510.
The two relevant parts of the treaty between Spain and the United States provide:
A. In case of urgency a Contracting Party may apply to the other Contracting Party for
the provisional arrest of the person sought pending the presentation of the request for
extradition through the diplomatic channel. The application may be made.., through
the diplomatic channel ....

B. The application shall contain a description of the person sought, an indication of
intention to request the extradition of the person sought and a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction or sentence against that person,
and such further information, if any, as may be required by the requested Party.
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provisional arrest.' 2 However, the court also held that the govern183
ment showed adequate evidence to establish probable cause.
In In the Matter of Extradition of Russell,18 4 the government received information through diplomatic channels that the defendant
had committed violations of the Colombian penal code. 185 The complaint filed by the government included: (1) a statement that a warrant
had been issued for the defendant by the Colombian court; (2) details
of the crimes charged; (3) a description of the defendant; and (4) the
defendant's address. 86 The Fifth Circuit held that "assuming without
deciding that the Treaty requires a showing of probable cause to support a provisional arrest before an extradition hearing, we agree with
the district court that the magistrate had enough evidence before him
to show probable cause to detain Russell."'1 87 In addition to its holding, the court questioned the formality required in the presentation of
88
evidence for a provisional arrest.'
Caltagirone, Sahagian, and Russell held all that appropriate language within an extradition treaty should be interpreted to require a
showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest. Furthermore, they
acknowledged that the issue of probable cause for a provisional arrest
can be addressed through the application of the Fourth Amendment
based on two conditions. First, the countries involved must not have a
treaty with language that could be interpreted to require probable
cause for a provisional arrest. 189 Second, the judge or magistrate
overseeing that provisional arrest must grant a warrant based solely
upon the foreign complaint. If these two conditions are met and the
court recognizes that § 3184 does not require probable cause, then the
issue may be addressed constitutionally. The 1997 panel decision of
Parretti v. United States' 90 is the only case to date that has presented
this situation.

Id. at 511 n.1 (citing Treaty on Extradition, May 29, 1970, U.S.-Spain, art. XI, 22 U.S.T. 737, as
amended Jan. 25, 1975, 29 U.S.T. 2283).
182. Id. at 511 n.1.
183. See id. at 512 n.4.
184. 647 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
185. See id. at 1050-51.
186. See id.
187. United States v. Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986).
188. See id.

189. See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1988); Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217;
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997).
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D.

The Special CircumstancesDoctrine

Wright v. Henkel,19 1 decided by the Supreme Court almost a cen92
tury ago, is the governing authority on access to bail in extradition.
The defendant presented the Court with an application to attain bail
in a foreign extradition hearing. 193 The Supreme Court took the defendant's appeal and analyzed the issue of bail. 194 Although the Court
recognized that there was "no statute providing for admission to bail
in cases of foreign extradition,"'195 it established a "special circumstances" doctrine to guide the lower courts in decisions concerning
bail. The Court stated:
We are unwilling to hold that the circuit courts possess no power in
respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by statute, or that, while bail should not ordinarily b6 granted in cases of
foreign extradition, those courts may not in any
case, and whatever
196
the special circumstances, extend that relief.
In its holding, the Court acknowledged that the power to grant bail
1 97
existed despite the absence of specific statutory or treaty provisions.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision directed the lower courts
to determine whether any special circumstances existed in order to
help in the decision to grant or deny bail.1 98 Despite its holding,, the
Court affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition for bail because
it did not consider the possible development of pneumonia as a special
circumstance to warrant bail. 199 However, aside from its holding, the
Court failed to demonstrate what exactly constituted special circumstances. As a result, the issue was left for the lower courts to deter191. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
192. See id. at 63. The case simply mentioned the words "special circumstances" and it was
the duty of the lower courts to decide within their power whether this doctrine would be developed. See id. Consequently, a majority of the circuits have applied the special circumstances
doctrine on a case-by-case basis. See id.
193. See id. at 43. The extradition request came from England because the defendant had
been accused of making fraudulent reports and statements to corporations. See id. at 42.
194. See id. at 43. "[Tlhe commissioner denied the application on the ground that no power
existed for admitting petitioner to bail." Id.
195. Id. at 63. The Court further acknowledged:
[Siection 5270 of the Revised Statutes [(U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, P. 3591)] is inconsistent
with its allowance after committal, for it is there provided that if he finds the evidence
sufficient, the commissioner or judge "shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the
person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be
made."
Id. at 62.
196. Id. at 63.
197. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 692.
198. See id.
199. See Henkel, 190 U.S. at 43.
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mine on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the Court, in contrast to
domestic hearings, established a presumption against bail.2 00
The first reported case to interpret the Supreme Court's opinion
was In re Mitchell.20 1 In that case, the defendant applied for bail
claiming special circumstances.2 02 The Canadian government vehemently opposed the application for bail and claimed that the court did
not have the authority to grant bail in extradition.20 3 However, Judge
Learned Hand stated that the Supreme Court in Wright v. Henke1204
"distinctly affirmed" the power of the courts to grant bail.20 5 Furthermore, according to the court, the Supreme Court clearly indicated "its
judgment that the power should be exercised only in the most pressing
circumstances, and when the requirements of justice are absolutely
peremptory. 20 6 Therefore, the court held that the defendant's request for bail should be granted because special circumstances did exist.207 According to Judge Hand:
[W]hile I quite agree with the learned counsel for his Majesty's government that the right is a dangerous one, and ought to be exercised
with great circumspection, it seems to me that the hardship here
upon the imprisoned person is so great as to make peremptory some
kind of enlargement at the present time, for the purpose only of free
consultation in the8 conduct of the civil suit upon which his whole
20
fortune depends.
The scope of special circumstances encompassed peremptory requirements of justice. 20 9 Thus, the loss of the defendant's ability to
consult with his attorney when his entire fortune was at stake consti200. The Court stated:
The demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it
to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and
the other government is under obligation to make the surrender; an obligation which it
might be impossible to fulfill if release on bail were permitted.
14. at 62.
201. 171 F. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
202. See id. at 289. The defendant's application "is made to enlarge him upon bail for the
reason that at present he is entirely unable to consult with his counsel and prepare for the remainder of the trial, which will consume, probably, the 28th, 29th, and 30th days of June." Id.
203. See id.
204. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
205. See Mitchell, 171 F. at 289.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 289-90.
208. Id. at 290. After agreeing with the defendant that special circumstances did exist, the
court restricted its holding by stating: "Those special circumstances alone move me to allow him
to bail, and his enlargement is to be limited strictly to the period of that suit. As soon as that is
terminated he must be returned to the Tombs prison to await determination of ...the extradition proceedings." Id.
209. See id.
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tuted a special circumstance. 2 10 Although Mitchell granted bail to the
defendant, the logic of the opinion was clearly molded within the narrow framework of Wright v. Henkel.
As illustrated by Mitchell, a lower court must determine through its
discretion what claims create a special circumstance. In extradition,
the defendant rather than the government carries the burden of establishing that bail should be granted. 21 ' As a result, each circuit has
encountered a variety of claims purported to be a special circumstance
in a bail hearing. Some defendants have established the existence of a
special circumstance. In United States v. Taitz,2 12 for example, the
court held that the defendant was not a flight risk and that special
circumstances existed. 2 13 Other claims have not sufficiently established a special circumstance. In United States v. Smyth, 2 14 the court
held that the defendant's needs to consult with counsel, gather evi215
dence, and interview witnesses were not special circumstances.
210. The dictum of the opinion suggested that the defendant did not seem to be flight prone:
"I am also moved to this disposition from the fact that he has long known of the proposed
proceedings and has made no effort to avoid them or escape." Id.
211. See Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317, 318 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Leitner,
784 F.2d 159, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1986).
212. 130 F.R.D. 442 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
213. See id. at 447 (reasoning that the combination of the defendant's claims, such as poor
health, the restriction on his ability to carry out his religious rituals, the availability of bail in the
requesting country, and a showing that the crime might not warrant extradition, were sufficient
for the special circumstances doctrine); United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 863-66 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a combination of five factors constituted a special circumstance: (1) an unusual delay in the appeal process; (2) a defendant in a similar extradition situation received bail;
(3) the requesting country will not credit time spent in United States custody; (4) the "Lobue
Cloud" which resulted from a case stating that the extradition statute was unconstitutional; and
(5) the defendants who were Catholics of Northern Ireland enjoyed sympathy from citizens of
the United States); Salerno, 878 F.2d at 318 (noting that a serious deterioration in one's health
and an unusual delay in the appeal process may be sufficient to establish a special circumstance);
Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a special circumstance
existed when there were no suitable holding facilities for the defendant who was a juvenile);
McNamara v. Henkel, 46 F.2d 84, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (holding that special circumstances existed
when extradition hearing had been delayed for four years); In re Gannon, 27 F.2d 362, 363 (E.D.
Pa. 1928) (stating that a special circumstance existed when bail was available in the requesting
country).
214. 976 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1992).
215. See id. at 1536 (stating that all of the defendant's claims have been experienced by other
incarcerated individuals); see also United States v. Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the defendant's arguments of special circumstances, which included that he did not
have ample time with his attorney, that he was not personally involved with his attorney's investigative efforts, that his financial and emotional circumstances were extraordinary, and that he
was a tolerable bail risk); United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
there are really no "special circumstances" unique to this appellant like those in previously decided cases); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that simply
because the defendant's brother was released on bail was insufficient to establish special circumstances); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp. 904, 919 (D. Mass. 1990) (rejecting the defendant's
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1. Special Circumstances Interpreted Liberally
Within the context of the provisional arrest, the special circumstances doctrine has received a liberal interpretation.2 16 In Beaulieu v.
Hartigan,the court stated that the "granting of bail pending completion of the extradition proceedings has been the rule rather than the
exception."'2 17 The court recognized that a judge in an extradition
case should exercise a higher degree of review when considering bail
because of its international character. 21 8 Although the holding in
Beaulieu was overruled at the appellate level, the district court's opinion acknowledged that the special circumstances doctrine provided
a district judge with flexibility and discretion in considering whether
bail should be granted in these extradition cases .... [O]ne of the
basic questions ... in either situation is whether, under all the cir-

cumstances, the petitioner is likely to return to court when directed
to do so. Fundamentally, it is a judgment call . . . based on the
totality of the circumstances, including the extremely important
consideration
of this country's treaty agreements with other
2 19
nations.
According to Beaulieu, the court should focus on the idea of fundamental fairness rather than special circumstances. 220 Through a fundamental fairness analysis, the court should consider both the
defendant's rights and concerns regarding the preparation of an ade221
quate defense by his or her counsel.
claim because pending civil litigation was not imminent); United States v. Hills, 765 F. Supp. 381,
385-86 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that because the defendant is not a flight risk was not
enough); United States v. Tang Yee-Chun, 657 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that
the defendant's difficulty in communicating with counsel during translation of a large number of
documents and the complexity of the legal issues involved did not create a special circumstance
for bail); United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, 743 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (rejecting the defendants' claims that they were good bail risks and that extraditability in this case was doubtful as
"special circumstances" sufficient to justify granting bail).
216. See, e.g., Messina, 566 F. Supp. at 742 (quoting a diplomatic note stating that "[iun general
it is the practice of United States courts to allow persons provisionally arrested to remain at
large on bond if there is no evidence that the person is about to flee").
217. 430 F. Supp. 915, 916 (D. Mass. 1977) (citing cases in which the defendant had been
granted bail).
218. See id. at 917.
2t9. Id. This case was overruled the following month in Beaulieu v. Hartigan. 554 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1977). The court stated that: "while bail may be granted in the sound discretion of the
district court, the matter should be approached with caution and bail should be granted only
upon a showing of special circumstances. Unlike the situation for domestic crimes, there is no
presumption favoring bail." id. at 1-2. See In re Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stating that "bail should be denied in extradition proceedings absent special circumstances").
220. See 430 F. Supp. at 917.
221. There have been instances where a court has granted bail absent any special circumstances. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADIITION, supra note 14, at 694-95 (citing to a
number of cases granting bail without special circumstances).
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In 1997, the Ninth Circuit further extended the reasoning of Beaulieu. In Parrettiv. United States, the court addressed whether the denial of bail prior to an extradition hearing deprived the defendant of
liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.2 2 2 The government contended that its interest in fulfilling its treaty obligations to other countries outweighed the personal liberty of the defendant. 223 However,
the court reemphasized that "in our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. '2 2 4 The court held that the defendant's detention violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and granted bail even
though no special circumstances were found.225 The Ninth Circuit
stressed that a court should look to two factors when determining bail:
(1) whether the defendant represents a flight risk; and (2) whether the
defendant represents a threat to the safety of the community. 226 This
holding was lost due to the Ninth Circuit's use of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.
II.

SUBJECT OPINION

The foreign extradition of Giancarlo Parretti presented the judiciary
with a case of first impression. Parretti v. United States227 presented
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit with a unique opportunity
because probable cause was not required by the governing treaty for
Parretti's provisional arrest. 228 The issuing magistrate approved a
provisional arrest warrant based on the evidence in the complaint
alone.2 29 The language of the extradition treaty between France and
2 30
the United States remained silent as to the issue of probable cause.
222. See 122 F.3d 758, 781 (9th Cir. 1997).
223. See id. at 780.
224. Id. at 781 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
225. See id.
226. See id.; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 268 (1984) (holding that the detention

of a juvenile was valid because of the risk that he would commit a crime against the community
before the return date); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (holding that the deten-

tion of a mentally ill patient was necessary to protect himself and the community from potential
danger that he may cause); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542 (1952) (holding that the commitment of communists prior to deportation proceedings was valid because of the risk of danger
that they represented).
227. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997).

228. See id. at 761.
229. See id.
230. See Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-Fr., 22 U.S.T. 407, as amended Feb. 12, 1970,
T.I.A.S. 7075.
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Facts

Giancarlo Parretti, a financier who was a citizen and resident of Italy, headed Pathe Communications Corporation ("Pathe"). 2 31 In
1990, Pathe acquired MGM-United Artists for approximately $1.3 billion. 232 This transaction led to the merger of the two corporations to
form MGM-Pathe Communications Corporation. 233 However, Parretti highly leveraged the purchase of MGM-United Artist and the
new corporation experienced immediate financial difficulties. 234 As a
result, several lawsuits were filed in response to the leveraged transac2 35
tion and the merger that followed.
On October 9, 1995, Parretti left Italy and entered the United States
to answer charges of perjury in a related suit filed in Delaware Superior Court, and to attend his own deposition for another suit filed in
Los Angeles Superior Court. 236 The next day, France sent a diplomatic note to the United States Department of State requesting Parretti's provisional arrest "pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty of
Extradition between the United States and France ....
,,237 Acting on
behalf of the French Government, the AUSA for the Central District
of California presented the United States Magistrate Judge Joseph
Reichmann with a "Complaint for Provisional Arrest Warrant. 2 38
The AUSA stated that on May 3, 1995 the French Government issued
an international arrest warrant for Giancarlo Parretti. 39 The warrant
alleged that Parretti had been charged "with various crimes arising
from his alleged looting of the French company Europe Image Distri,,240
bution (EID), one of MGM-Pathe's subsidiaries ....
231. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761.
232. See id.
233. See id.

234. See id.
235. See id.
236. Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
237. Id. at 510. According to France, this was to detain Parretti until it decided whether to
seek a formal extradition of Parretti for his alleged offenses. See id. "Article IV provides for the
,arrest and detention of a fugitive . . . on information . . .of the existence of . . . a warrant of

arrest' and for the person 'provisionally arrested' to be held for up to 40 days pending a possible
request that the fugitive be extradited." Parretti,122 F.3d at 761. See Treaty on Extradition, Jan.

6, 1909, U.S.-Fr., 22 U.S.T. 407, as amended Feb. 12, 1970, T.I.A.S. 7075.
238. Parretti, 143 F.3d at 510 n.l.

239. See id.
240. Parretti,122 F.3d at 761. "As alleged in the Complaint, the French arrest warrant charges
Parretti with: (1)misuse of the assets of EID; (2) forging documents and using them; (3) embezzlement from EID by false pretenses; and (4) knowingly attesting to materially inaccurate facts,

and knowingly making use of such a false attestation." Id. at 761 n.1.
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Judge Reichmann issued the provisional arrest warrant for Parretti
based solely upon the allegations of the complaint. 241 These allegations were based on the AUSA's information and belief that the
French arrest warrant actually contained the various charges of Parretti's misdeeds. 242 However, the French arrest warrant itself was not
physically attached to the complaint upon which Judge Reichmann
based his decision. 243 The complaint also lacked affidavits and other
competent evidence that the judge could use to make a sufficient finding of probable cause. 244 As a result, on October 18, 1995, while Parretti was undergoing his own deposition in Los Angeles, federal
agents armed with a provisional arrest warrant entered the law offices
of White & Case to arrest Parretti. 245 After Parretti's arrest, the
United States government held him for thirty-three days without bail
while the French government determined whether to request a formal
246
extradition hearing.
B.

ProceduralHistory

The District Court

1.

At his bail hearing and during his habeas corpus petition in front of
the district court, Parretti claimed that the arrest warrant violated the
Fourth Amendment for two reasons. 247 First, Parretti contended that
the warrant lacked probable cause because it was not based on evidence that he had actually committed the crimes charged by the
French arrest warrant. 248 More specifically, Parretti claimed that the
United States warrant was simply grounded on the existence of the
French warrant and that this did not provide Judge Reichmann with
enough information.2 49 The government countered by stating that the
warrant was "'supported by specific facts that are set forth in the
Complaint, relaying facts that were conveyed to the United States by
241. See id. at 761.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 760.
246. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 760, 764 n.6.
247. See id. at 761.
248. See id. Parretti stated:
[I]f you look at the language in the Complaint, what they say, is that based on the
French warrant, we are stating the following. All that they are doing is regurgitating to
the court what they have obtained from the warrant from France. We don't know what
the investigating magistrate based those statements on.
Id.

249. See id. at 762.
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France." 250 The district court denied Parretti's argument and held
that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to believe the charges of the
251
French warrant.
Second, Parretti claimed that his provisional arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment because Judge Reichmann failed to make a probable cause determination. 252 According to Parretti, Judge Reichmann
believed that the government's restatement of the allegations of the
French arrest warrant "'was sufficient at this stage."253 The government countered Parretti's argument by stating that "[a] warrant for a
'provisional arrest' in an extradition case may be issued without an
evidentiary showing that the accused has committed a crime. ' 254
More specifically, the government suggested that it vary the standard
of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment depending on
whether the accused is answering charges to a foreign government or
answering domestic charges. 255 The district court did not acknowledge either argument on this issue because it had held that the existence of the French warrant was sufficient for Parretti's provisional
256
arrest.
The district court also denied Parretti's application for bail despite
the government's failure to characterize him as a flight risk.2 57 According to the judge, the Supreme Court established the special circumstances doctrine in Wright v. Henkel, which stated that "bail in
extradition cases is 'only granted under exceptional circumstances.'"258 Parretti offered four possible special circumstances: (1)
his probable success in defeating a formal extradition hearing; (2) his
need to participate in civil litigation; (3) his deteriorating health; and
(4) the failure of the French government to extradite him for five
months after the warrant had been issued.2 59 The district court re250. Id.

251. See id. The district court stated that the government had 40 days, according to the treaty,
to make a clear presentation in reply to Parretti's argument that the government failed to make
an evidentiary showing. See id.
252. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 762.
253. Id. Despite this, Judge Riechmann admitted that "these naked allegations might not be
sufficient to establish probable cause at the extradition hearing itself ..... Id.
254. Id.
255. See id. The government supported its position by arguing that the federal courts must
defer to the Secretary of State who may accept a foreign warrant as establishing probable cause
on its face. See id.

256. See id. at 763.
257. See id.

258. Parretti,122 F.3d at 763 (citing Wright v. Henkle, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903)).
259. See id.
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jected each as failing to establish a special circumstance.2 60 After the
district court denied both his habeas corpus and bail claims, Parretti
261
filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit for an emergency review.
2.

The United States Court of Appeals

The Ninth Circuit granted Parretti's motion for emergency review
and released him from prison immediately. 262 The court held in a
panel opinion that Parretti's arrest violated the Fourth Amendment
because "the government had failed to make the required evidentiary
showing of probable cause to believe Parretti had committed an extraditable crime. '2 63 The court also held that in light of the district
court's finding that Parretti was not a flight risk "his detention without
260. See id. (reasoning that Parretti did not demonstrate special circumstances because he
would be officially extradited in a formal hearing, that he was receiving sufficient medical treatment while in prison, and that he was still able to participate in his civil lawsuits while he was
incarcerated).
261. See id. Parretti filed his motion under the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit Rule 27-3, which outlines the procedure for pursuing emergency motions. See id. Rule
27-3 reads:
If a movant certifies that to avoid irreparable harm relief is needed in less than 21 days,
the motion shall be governed by the following requirements;
(1) before filing the motion, the movant shall make every practicable effort to notify
the Clerk and opposing counsel, and to serve the motion, at the earliest possible time.
(2) the motion shall be filed with the Clerk in San Francisco, unless counsel for the
movant certifies that relief is required on the day the motion is filed or the next day,
and that counsel has not been dilatory in seeking it. In such case, the motion may be
filed in a divisional clerk's office or, if there is no office in the district, with an individual
circuit judge. Counsel must also transmit a copy of the motion, by overnight delivery,
to the Clerk in San Francisco. If it appears that same day or next day relief is not
necessary, or if it appears in a case not involving imminent execution of a sentence of
death that counsel has been dilatory in requesting relief, the moving party will be directed to file the motion in San Francisco.
(3) Any motion under this Rule shall have a cover page bearing the legend "Emergency
Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3" and the caption of the case. A certificate of counsel
for the movant, entitled "Circuit Rule 27-3 Certificate," shall follow the cover page and
shall contain:
(i) The telephone numbers and office addresses of the attorneys for the parties;
(ii) Facts showing the existence and nature of the claimed emergency; and
(iii) When and how counsel for the other parties were notified and whether they have
been served with the motion; or, if not notified and served, why that was not done.
(4) If the relief sought in the motion was available in the district court, the motion shall
state whether all grounds advanced in support thereof in this court were submitted to
the district court, and, if not, why the motion should not be remanded or denied.
9TH CIR. R. 27-3.

262. See Parretti,122 F.3d at 763. Giancarlo Parretti had already spent 33 days in jail before
the court of appeals ordered his release. See id. at 764. On November 29, 1995, eight days after
his release, the French government filed for and the United States government requested a formal extradition hearing for Parretti. See id. at 764 n.6.
263. Id. at 763.
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bail violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment .... 264
The government appealed both of the court's independent holdings.
On May 10, 1996, Parretti attended his formal extradition hearing,
and twenty-one days later the court finally held that he was extraditable. 265 After its decision, the court reconsidered the issue of bail and
"the magistrate judge released Parretti on bail, with the government's
stipulated consent . "266 Parretti then attended an unrelated trial in
Delaware and was convicted of state charges. 267 While his bail hearing in Delaware was pending, Parretti fled that jurisdiction and returned to Italy.2 68 This had no bearing on the district court's earlier
finding that he was not a flight risk. 269 However, it did heavily influ27 0
ence the en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit a year later.
C. Majority Opinion
After the Ninth Circuit's panel decision, the government immediately appealed. The Ninth Circuit granted the government's appeal
and heard it en banc on December 18, 1997 in order to review its
earlier decision concerning the two issues. 27' First, the en banc court
was presented with the issue of whether the provisional arrest of Parretti pursuant to a valid treaty between France and the United States
violated the Fourth Amendment. 27 2 Second, the court was asked to
decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
violated because Parretti was detained without bail prior to his formal
extradition. 27 3 However, the majority refused to consider the two
constitutional issues because Parretti fled the United States while the
appeal was pending. 274 Rather than examine these two issues, the
court exercised its discretion under the Fugitive Disentitlement Doc275
trine in order to withdraw its panel opinion and dismiss the appeal.
According to the court, "[t]he Supreme Court has 'consistently and
unequivocally approve[d] dismissal as an appropriate sanction when a
264. Id. at 763-64. The appellate court required that he surrender any passports and that he
seek the approval of the district court before he left the jurisdiction of California. See Parretti v.
United States, 143 F.3d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
265. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 764 n.6.
266. Id.

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 776 n.22.
id.
id.
Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
id. at 508, 509.
id. at 509.
id.
id.
id.
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prisoner is a fugitive during the ongoing appellate process." 276 The
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine provided the Ninth Circuit with the
power to dismiss the appeal because Parretti fled the United States
277
and thus became a fugitive.
The court offered four rationales to justify its dismissal under the
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. 278 First, the court stated that Parretti was disentitled from calling upon the resources of the court when
he decided to flee the jurisdiction of the United States and return to
Italy.279 Second, the court feared that if it did consider the merits of
28 0
the constitutional claims it would be unable to enforce its judgment.
If it upheld the district court's holding, it would be unable to secure
Parretti's presence in order to enforce its judgment because he remained a fugitive. 281 Third, the court justified its use of the doctrine
because it would protect the dignity of the appellate process and serve
282
as a deterrent to future parties from fleeing the jurisdiction.
Fourth, the adversarial procedure of criminal litigation would be compromised when the defendant was a fugitive. 283 According to the majority, a fugitive's attorney may have little incentive to attend and
represent the defendant in future proceedings. 284 As a result, the "defendant's flight threatens the effective operation of the appellate process . . "285
D.

Dissent

In the sole dissent, Judge Reinhardt stated that the majority misapplied the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. 286 "The purpose of the
doctrine is to deny to those who have fled the court's jurisdiction any
benefits of the court system. ' 287 However, Reinhardt stated that
under the procedural facts of this case it was clear that the doctrine
276. Parretti,143 F.3d at 510 (quoting Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242

(1993)).
277. See id.
278. See id. at 511.
279. See id. According to the court, "although Parretti's status as a fugitive does not 'strip the
case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy,' it does disentitle him from calling
upon the resources of the court to resolve his claims." Id.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 512-13.
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did not serve its purpose.2 88 In this case, Parretti filed an emergency
appeal, which was granted, and he was thereafter released. 2 89 Soon
afterwards France filed a request for Parretti's formal extradition and
made the requisite showing of probable cause. 290 However, after its
hearing the government failed to request that Parretti be returned to
federal custody. 29' As a result, the state of Delaware assumed juris2 92
diction over Parretti.
293
In Delaware, Parretti was tried and convicted of criminal charges.
While awaiting sentencing, Parretti fled Delaware and returned to Italy. 294 The Ninth Circuit released its panel decision and the government immediately requested a rehearing by the court en banc.2 95 Due
to these circumstances, the dissent believed that the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine was inapplicable because it failed to deny Parretti
any benefit that he had not already obtained.2 96 "The fugitive disentitlement doctrine makes sense only when we deny the fugitive some
form of relief from the court, not when we frustrate our own ability to
' 2' 97
resolve critical constitutional questions.
Judge Reinhardt reasoned that these constitutional issues warranted
consideration.2 98 He believed that the government of the United
States should not have the ability to arrest a person without probable
cause simply because a foreign country might request the extradition
of that individual.2 99 Judge Reinhardt stated that this was "at odds
with one of our most basic constitutional principles-that the government cannot seize a person off the streets (or from a lawyer's office)
and deny him his liberty without first showing probable cause to believe he has engaged in criminal activity. ' 30 0 Contrary to the government's claim, the belief that a foreign country has issued an arrest
288. See Parretti,143 F.3d at 512. According to the dissent, "the doctrine makes sense only as
a 'sanction' against the defendant." Id. at 513.
289. See id. at 512.
290. See id.
291. See id.

292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 512.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 513.
297. Id. The dissent also acknowledged two other points. First, in this case it was the government that sought relief, and it did not seek relief through the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine.
See id. Second, Parretti's attorney maintained the adversarial process because he submitted a
brief discussing the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine when requested by the court. See id. at 513
n.3.
298. See id. at 511.
299. See id.
300. Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511.
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warrant does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. 3 t11Judge
Reinhardt also believed that the majority's failure to address the issue
of bail would have a disturbing effect on the Ninth Circuit. 30 2 The
case law of the Ninth Circuit would remain in disarray if it continued
to rely upon the "cryptic language" of a case that is nearly a century
3
old. 30
III.

ANALYSIS

The judiciary of the United States has been vested with certain inherent powers 30 4 in order to manage and protect its own proceedings
and judgments. 30 5 Due to the possible effects of a court's inherent
powers there exists a "danger of overreaching when one branch of the
Government" is able to define its own authority without being
checked by another. 30 6 However, these powers are not unconstrained
because courts are bound by the Constitution of the United States,
30 7
rules of procedure, and statutes.
The judiciary must practice restraint when it resorts to its inherent
powers and should administer those powers only as a reasonable response to its problems. 30 8 The decision in Parrettiv. United States represents an example of a court that misused its inherent power. This
analysis of the Parrettidecision criticizes the Ninth Circuit's application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine as an unreasonable solution in light of the constitutional merits of the case. It will also
establish that discretion was the best alternative for the court given
the importance of the issues presented.
A.

The Majority's Use of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

A brief review of the procedural facts of Parretti is required to understand the errors in the majority's application of the doctrine. After
Parretti had been incarcerated for thirty-three days, a panel for the
Ninth Circuit ordered his release from prison based upon the Fourth
301. See id.
302. See id. at 512.
303. See id.
304. Some of these powers include contempt power, disciplinary power over attorneys, dismissal for failure to prosecute, sentences for abuse of the judicial process, the ability to strike
pleadings, and the ability to impose sanctions and costs. See Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 565
(6th Cir. 1995); see also U.S. CONST art. III.
305. See Prevot, 59 F.3d at 565.
306. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
307. See Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield: Due Process and The Fugitive Disentitlement

Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 753 (1997); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517
U.S. 416, 421-23 (1996).
308. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 824; see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145-49 (1985).
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and Fifth Amendments. 30 9 Eight days after his release, the federal
government made a request for Parretti's formal extradition upon
310
which the district court made a proper showing of probable cause.
However, the government failed to take Parretti back into federal custody and, as a result, the state of Delaware retained jurisdiction over
3
him. 11

Subsequently, the state tried and the Delaware court convicted Parretti on criminal charges, but before his sentencing he fled the jurisdiction of Delaware and returned to Italy. 312 Soon afterwards, the Ninth
Circuit released its panel opinion and the government objected to the
panel's resolution of the constitutional issues. 313 As a result, the government sought and was granted a rehearing en banc to review the
constitutional issues of the case. 314 Based on these facts it would seem
that the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine did not apply to the current
situation.
1. The Ortega-Rodriguez Test
As mentioned in Part I, it has been recognized for over a century
that an appellate court possesses the ability to dismiss the appeal of a
defendant who remains a fugitive during the pendency of his or her
appeal. 315 Since 1879, the Supreme Court has justified the use of this
doctrine through a variety of rationales. These include a court's inability to enforce a judgment against a fugitive, the promotion of the
efficient operation of the judicial process, the protection of the court's
dignity, and the disentitlement of a fugitive's ability to seek relief from
a court that he or she disrespected. 31 6 In March of 1993, the Supreme
Court defined the proper scope of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doc317
trine in Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States.
Based on the facts of Ortega-Rodriguez,the Court established a test
that required the existence of "some connection" between the individual's fugitive status and the appellate process. 318 According to the
309. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See supra notes 73-104 and accompanying text. This rule was first applied in Smith v.
United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
316. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
317. 507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993).
318. Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 244. On this point, the Court was unanimous because
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent "that there must be some 'connection' between
escape and the appellate process." Id. at 252.
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Court, the scope of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine is limited to
a court's ability to control its own proceedings. 3 19 Therefore, for a
sufficient connection to exist, the individual's fugitive status must
either affect a court's ability to carry out its own proceedings or prejudice the government as a litigant. 320 Thus, when a defendant appeals
his criminal conviction while he remains a fugitive, the test of OrtegaRodriguez would be satisfied because the pending proceedings would
be frustrated. 32 1 The Supreme Court refused to expand the doctrine

in a way that would allow an appellate court to dismiss an appeal if an
322
individual exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system.
Critics of the Ortega-Rodriguez case contend that a connection between the appellate process and the individual's fugitive status only
applies in limited circumstances. 323 More specifically, they argue that

the "connection" requirement is merely an alternative for a court to
consider when the individual's status as a fugitive has ended. 324 This
narrow interpretation is based on the fact that in Ortega-Rodriguez,
the individual's fugitive status had ended, as he was returned to cus-

tody before his appeal. 325 Although it is true that the individual in
Ortega-Rodriguez was no longer a fugitive when he filed his appeal,

there remains no exception for the "connection" requirement. 326 In
Ortega-Rodriguez, the Court recognized that the Fugitive Disentitle-

ment Doctrine was a tool which allowed the judiciary to exercise control over its docket and proceedings. 327 As a result, if there is no
connection which affects the court's ability to carry out the judicial
process then the doctrine should be inapplicable. The reasoning of
Ortega-Rodriguez emphasized that regardless of whether a person re319. See id. at 244-46.
320. See id. For examples of the government's prejudice, see United States v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17
F.3d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing defendant's appeal because his 13 year fugitive status
prevented the government from having sufficient appellate review); United States v. Rosales, 13
F.3d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal based on the defendant's five year fugitive
status).
321. See Daccarett-Ghia v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 621, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
322. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246. The proposed expansion was to allow an appellate court to act even if there was no connection. The Court stated: "[s]uch a rule would sweep
far too broadly, permitting, for instance, this Court to dismiss a petition solely because the petiId.
tioner absconded for a day during district court proceedings .
323. See Daccarett-Ghia,70 F.3d at 626.
324. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246.
325. See id.; see also Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
doctrine did not apply because the individual was no longer a fugitive).
326. See Daccarett-Ghia,70 F.3d at 627.
327. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246.
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mains a fugitive, there must be a connection in order to invoke the
328
dismissal rule.
2.

The Majority's Failureto Apply the Ortega-Rodriguez Test

The first four lines of the Parrettien banc opinion are a direct quote
of the Ortega-Rodriguez case. However, the majority selectively used
the opinion to establish that the Supreme Court has continuously approved of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. As a result, the
Ninth Circuit failed to determine whether there was "some connection" between Parretti's fugitive status and the ongoing appellate process. Instead, the court simply compared Parretti's fugitive status to
four rationales of the doctrine and reasoned that this combination was
enough to justify its use as reasonable.
a. The En Banc Opinion Effectively Disentitled the Government
The majority first stated that Parretti's fugitive status "disentitled
him from calling upon the resources of the court to resolve his
claims. '329 Despite using the rationale established in Molinaro, the
court failed to justify the connection of Parretti's fugitive status to the
appellate process. The purpose of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine is to deny the benefits of the judicial system to those who flee a
court's jurisdiction. 330 However, this justification is without merit
here because Parretti could not be denied any further benefit from the
en banc appeal. 331
As described in Part II, Parretti received complete relief from the
court's panel decision when he was released from his provisional
arrest based upon a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 332
Eight days later, Parretti faced a formal extradition hearing in which
the evidentiary requirements were properly met. 333 Due to the potential impact of the panel opinion, the government sought relief from
the Ninth Circuit by requesting it to reconsider its decision en banc. 334
However, the en banc opinion effectively denied the government,
rather than Parretti, the benefits of appellate review. As a result, the
important constitutional issues of a provisional arrest were left unresolved and the government was unable to dispel its concern.
328. See id.
329. Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing Molinaro v.
New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)).
330. See id.at 512-13 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
331. See id.at 513.
332. See supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
333. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 509-10.
334. See id.
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Based upon the reasoning of the en banc opinion, the court attempted to create a connection between Parretti's fugitive status and
the panel opinion. However, the focus of the court should have been
on developing a connection between the government's appeal and
Parretti's fugitive status. If conducted in this manner, the court, in its
analysis, would have discovered that Parretti's fugitive status could
not be penalized through disentitlement. Instead, the court's decision
revealed no connection between the government's appeal and Parretti's failure to appear in Delaware for sentencing. This effectively
disentitled the government from the benefits of the judicial process
because it was unable to have its appeal properly reviewed by the appellate court. Rather, the Ninth Circuit jeopardized the appeal of the
government in order to penalize Parretti for his actions in Delaware.
Dismissal of an appeal or a petition to appeal is based upon an equitable principle that a fugitive should be disentitled to the resources of
a court to review his conviction. 335 More specifically, a court should
not have to expend its resources to review an issue when one of the
parties is illegally absent. As a result, this equitable principle of disentitlement becomes inapplicable when the fugitive has had his conviction overturned and it is the government seeking the appeal. In this
situation, the government believes that equity should be in its favor
because it presented the court with an issue that needed to be resolved for the sake of future proceedings. If the court simply ignores
that issue and dismisses the case, then the government is faced with
uncertainty. Thus, the court should have reached and decided the
merits of the case, especially considering the constitutional issues
336
involved.
b. The Enforceability of the Court's Judgment
The court's next justification was an attempt to draw a connection
between Parretti's fugitive status and the inability of the appellate
court to enforce its judgment. Since the decision of Smith v. United
States the judiciary has justified its use of the Fugitive Disentitlement
Doctrine when it has been unable to secure the presence of the petitioner in order to enforce its judgment. 337 Without this protection, the
335. See United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 294-95 (1971); see also Molinaro v.
New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970).
336. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (deciding the merits of the case because of
the constitutional issues).
337. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. "Every application of the Smith rule nec[F]or the purpose of deciding whether
essarily assumes that an appeal may be meritorious ....
the Smith rule applies, I believe the merits of the appeal should be entirely disregarded." United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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judiciary and its supporters fear that a defendant could take full advantage of the judicial process and either wait for a favorable outcome
or avoid an adverse decision by fleeing the court's jurisdiction. 338
Consequently, a court's ability to maintain a meaningful judicial process would become diluted as individuals avoided unfavorable decisions. According to the Ninth Circuit, it was unable to guarantee the
enforceability of any judgment it rendered against Parretti due to the
339
fact that he remained a fugitive.
At the time of the en banc decision, Parretti was a fugitive of the
United States. Thus, it would have been nearly impossible for the
Ninth Circuit to obtain his presence for the district court while he remained in Italy. However, the court's ability to adjudicate the government's appeal was not directly related to the enforceability of a
decision against Parretti. When the Ninth Circuit issued its panel
opinion, it simply resolved the issues of Parretti's detention during his
provisional arrest. As stated before, once Parretti's appeal was resolved he was then subjected to a formal extradition hearing where
the government was able to meet the required evidentiary standards
for an extradition, thereby rendering the enforceability of the judgment insignificant to the resolution of the government's appeal.
The government's appeal was concerned with the precedent that the
panel opinion had established for a provisional arrest. 340 Due to the
inherent briefness of a provisional arrest, it is possible for the issue to
342
become moot 341 before the judicial process can be completed.
However, Parretti's situation avoided this problem because it contained a constitutional question that is "capable of repetition" but
continuously evades review. 343 As a result, the Ninth Circuit should
have addressed the constitutional issues challenged by the government of the United States regardless of enforceability. It has been
stated that when a party "seeks to vindicate a right vouchsafed by the
United States Constitution, the court should give weight to this factor
338. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
339. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Ortega-Rodriguez,
507 U.S. at 239-40).
340. See id. at 513.
341. For example:
A case is "moot" when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered,
cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy .... Question is "moot"
when it presents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1008 (6th ed. 1990).

342. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513.
343. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-23 (1988) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,
482 (1982)).
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in determining how to exercise its discretion. '344 As the dissent in
Parrettinoted, there is a reasonable possibility that in the future Parretti could be subject to the same provisional arrest. 345 Consequently,
the importance of resolving the constitutional standards of a provisional arrest outweighs the court's present ability to enforce its decision against Parretti.
c.

Dismissal Protects the Dignity of the Appellate Process

The court's third justification for using the Fugitive Disentitlement
Doctrine was that dismissal served as "an important deterrent function" for those who fled its jurisdiction. 346 It also stated that dismissal
promoted an "interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice" of the
court.347 Although dismissal may serve as a deterrent for those who
flee a court's jurisdiction, it must be pointed out that Parretti fled the
jurisdiction of a Delaware state court, not the Ninth Circuit. Some
have stated that dismissal should be used to protect all parts of the
348
federal judiciary regardless of the original jurisdiction that was fled.
349
According to the court in Broadway v. City of Montgomery,
it is
immaterial whether an individual fled the jurisdiction of a different
sovereign. 350 This is based on the belief that if an individual flees one
jurisdiction he or she has flouted the authority of all parts of the judiciary. 351 Thus, to deter escape, a court should dismiss an appeal regardless of whether an individual has fled its jurisdiction or the
jurisdiction of an unrelated court. As a result, the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine would limit an individual's access to all courts in the
United States if he or she has fled the jurisdiction of some court within
352
the United States.
However, the Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodriguez expressly denied
the Eleventh Circuit the power to protect the dignity of one of its
344. United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
345. See Parretti,143 F.3d at 513 n.2. The dissent further acknowledged that Parretti was an
international businessman who had many interests within the United States. See id. Thus, it is
possible that he could be subject to the same type of provisional arrest when and if he returns to
this country. See id. As a result, the decision reached by the Ninth Circuit could still be enforced against him. See id.
346. Id. at 511 (quoting Ortega-Rodreguez, 507 U.S. at 242).
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Daccarett-Ghia v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 621, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that
the government argued that when "an individual appeals his criminal conviction while he remains a fugitive, there is a connection between his fugitive status and the appellate proceedings,
which is all that Ortega-Rodriguez requires").
349. 530 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1976).
350. See id. at 659.
351. See Daccarett-Ghia,70 F.3d at 624.
352. See Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1995).
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district courts through dismissal. 353 The Court refused to expand the
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine to allow an appellate court "to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect
of the judicial system . . . . 354 According to the Court, the district
court was fully capable of defending itself and deterring flight from its
jurisdiction. 355 Likewise, the state court of Delaware was fully capable of defending its own dignity through a variety of sanctions, including the extradition of Parretti from Italy. It was not the duty of the
Ninth Circuit to abandon the government's appeal in order to protect
a different court system. This does not mean that a court could never
dismiss the appeal of an individual who was a fugitive of another jurisdiction. As long as a sufficient connection exists between the fugitive
status and the present appellate process, dismissal can be used. However, the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge that a sufficient nexus
was necessary.
d.

The Adversarial Character of the Appellate Process

Finally, the Ninth Circuit applied the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine because the adversarial character of criminal litigation would be
threatened by a party's fugitive status. 356 The court relied upon Justice Stevens' dissent in United States v. Sharpe,357 which explained that
an attorney would be less inclined to represent his client if he or she
was a fugitive from justice. 358 Justice Stevens assumed that an attor359
ney would usually lose all contact with his client after an escape.
Furthermore, he believed that an attorney would lack any interest or
motivation to defend a client in a future proceeding when the client
has violated the trust of the attorney-client relationship by becoming a
fugitive. 360 As suggested by the reasoning of Justice Stevens, the
Ninth Circuit refused to decide the merits of the case because of the
possibility that the adversarial process would not operate
36 1
effectively.
However, in Sharpe, a majority of the Supreme Court, which included six justices, remained skeptical about the threat a fugitive
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360,
361.

See
Id.
See
See
470
See
See
See
See

Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993).
id. at 247.
supra notes 283-285 and accompanying text.
U.S. 675 (1985).
id. at 723-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
id.
id.
supra notes 271-285 and accompanying text.
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might have on the adversarial process. 362 The Court emphasized that
Justice Stevens relied upon precedent that resolved situations in which
the fugitive requested an appeal. 363 Rather than dismissing the merits
of the case because the defendants had recently become fugitives, the
Court instructed their attorneys to submit briefs in support of their
position as amicus curiae. 364 As a result, the Court was able to decide
the merits of the case involved.
In Parretti,it was the government and not Parretti that sought review of the panel opinion. Also, as the dissent mentioned, Parretti's
counsel did agree to continue his representation despite Paretti's flight
to Italy. 365 In light of the procedural history of the case, it seems as
though Parretti's counsel had been a worthy and capable adversary
for the government. Therefore, the government would not be
prejudiced as a litigant and the adversarial process would be maintained as long as Parretti's counsel adequately served his client. 366 In
fact, one could argue that Parretti's attorney was now the attorney for
all of those who will face a provisional arrest warrant in the future. As
the dissent noted, "[t]he fugitive disentitlement doctrine makes sense
only when we deny the fugitive some form of relief from the court, not
when we frustrate our own ability to resolve critical constitutional
'367
questions.
B.

Policy Reasons Required a Review of the ConstitutionalIssues
Resolved in the Panel Opinion

The courts have never directly encountered the Fourth Amendment
requirement of probable cause pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant. Most courts have avoided the question by interpreting the language of the corresponding extradition treaty as requiring probable
cause. 368 However, the Ninth Circuit, in its panel opinion, was able to
362. See 470 U.S. at 681 n.2.
363. See id. The Court further stated:
JUSTICE STEVENS would have this Court adopt a rule that, whenever a respondent or
appellee before the Court becomes a fugitive before we render a decision, we must
vacate the judgment under review and remand with directions to dismiss the appeal.
This theory is not supported by our precedents ....
Id.
364. See id.
365. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 513 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
366. See id. at 512-13.
367. Id. at 513.
368. See, e.g., Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Article X1
of the extradition treaty between the United States and Spain as requiring a showing of probable
cause in order to obtain an arrest warrant); Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986)
(assuming, without deciding, that the treaty between the United States and the Republic of Co-
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break away from this restrictive mold and require a showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest through the Fourth Amendment. 36 9
The panel opinion also rejected a presumption against bail during a
provisional arrest when no evidence was established to show that the
individual was a threat to the community or a risk of flight. 3 70
The government requested the Ninth Circuit to review its panel
opinion en banc because it was concerned with the potential ramifications of that decision on foreign extradition. 37 1 More specifically, the
government believed that the panel opinion would restrict its ability
to conduct its foreign affairs in an efficient and reliable manner. 372 By
requiring a strong showing of probable cause in order to obtain a warrant for a provisional arrest, the government believed that the Ninth
Circuit established new obstacles for the United States to
373
overcome.
According to the government, foreign extradition treaties were created with the option of a provisional arrest in order to detain an individual temporarily while the requesting country developed its
evidence for a formal extradition. 374 The government claimed that the
provisional arrest would lose all meaning in foreign extradition if
probable cause were required for a provisional arrest warrant. It explained that an enormous amount of time would be required for a
country to manufacture, translate, and send information to a magistrate in order to satisfy a threshold requirement of probable cause. 375
When the requesting state spends time on establishing probable cause
for the provisional arrest warrant it offers the defendant an opportunity to take evasive action and travel worldwide. 376 As a result, the
government would be unable to fulfill its obligations under the respeclumbia required a showing of probable cause to support a provisional arrest before an extradition hearing); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that Article XII of the
extradition treaty between the United States and Italy "so clearly demands a showing of probable cause before any warrant for provisional arrest may issue, that we need not address the
constitutional question").
369. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 774-76 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra notes
227-230, 263 and accompanying text.
370. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 780-81; see also supra note 264 and accompanying text.
371. See Lis Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater
ConstitutionalProceduralProtections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition From the United States, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 729, 782-83 (1998) [hereinafter Wiehl, Extradition Law].
372. See id. at 783.
373. See id. at 784.
374. See id.

375. See id.
376. See id. at 782-86.
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tive extradition treaty. Consequently, the foreign relations between
377
the United States and its treaty partners would become strained.
The government also argued that a presumption against bail was
378
required to aid its success in carrying out its treaty obligations.
Without the ability to detain an individual without bail there was a
risk that the individual would flee before the formal extradition hearing could take place. Despite this justification, the length of a provisional arrest seems too long in light of today's advanced
communications between governments. 37 9 If a provisional arrest were
subject to the constitutional requirement of probable cause, the length
of detention would not be an issue.
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine has created a heavier burden for the government in future extradition hearings. By dismissing its panel opinion the court has left two
constitutional questions unresolved. First, does the Fourth Amendment require a showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest warrant? Second, is it a violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause to detain an individual who is not a flight risk? The only benefit obtained from the application of the doctrine was the punishment
of the defendant, Giancarlo Parretti. 380 However, this was a minimal
benefit at best because Parretti had received all the possible relief that
he could have obtained from the panel opinion. 3 8t Furthermore, the
only way in which Parretti could be punished would be if he were to
affirmatively return to the United States and invoke the protection of
382
the Ninth Circuit.
Despite its minor effect, the Ninth Circuit utilized its en banc opinion to deliver a message to others that have contemplated evading the
judiciary and becoming fugitives. The end result is that the court frustrated its own ability to resolve significant issues of foreign extradition
simply to prove a point for another court's jurisdiction. More importantly, it has left the government, whose appeal was ultimately dis377. See Wiehl, Extradition Law, supra note 371, at 783 (stating that a troubling aspect of the
panel opinion was its lack of deference to the Executive branch of government and its ability to
conduct foreign affairs).
378. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 778-80 (9th Cir. 1997).
379. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 681-84. Bassiouni also
stated that: "In 'provisional arrest' situations, the usual absence of evidence of 'probable cause'
presented by the requesting government leaves the relator with precious little to argue for in
support of his release on bail. And that makes the period of up to sixty days appear excessive."
Id. at 682.
380. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting).
381. See id. at 511-13.
382. See id.
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missed, to wander aimlessly in the extradition process without any
guidance. 383 Thus, the government has been rendered unable to determine the requirements for future provisional arrest proceedings.
Without a clear ruling from the court the government will continue to
obtain the provisional arrest warrant without a showing of probable
cause. As a result, in the future an individual that the government
seeks to detain will be released because the government has no guidance concerning the requirement for a proper provisional arrest
warrant.
C. A Proper Proceeding
The judiciary has never before in a foreign extradition case had the
opportunity to analyze a provisional arrest warrant within the framework of the United States Constitution. This is because some courts
have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3184 to require probable cause for a provisional arrest warrant. 384 However, this rationale is flawed because
§ 3184 only requires probable cause for a formal extradition hearing
and does not apply to provisional arrest warrants.
Other courts have interpreted the language "such, further information, if any" of foreign extradition treaties to require probable cause
for a provisional arrest. These decisions not only increased judicial
scrutiny but also enhanced judicial awareness that probable cause was
required for a provisional arrest warrant in some form. They also solidified that § 3184 only requires probable cause for a formal extradition hearing. In response to the judicial interpretation of treaty
language, the government began to eliminate the above language
from any foreign extradition treaty which contained it. As a result,
the requirement of probable cause for a provisional arrest warrant
was eliminated.
In Parretti,the Ninth Circuit was forced to rely upon the Constitution in order to resolve whether there must be a showing of probable
cause for a provisional arrest warrant. 385 Through its application of
383. According to the dissent, "[i]n light of these procedural and factual circumstances, it is
clear that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine has no applicability. Indeed, neither party has
urged the court to invoke the doctrine and both parties agree that the doctrine has no relevance
to the case." Id. at 512.

384. See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 14, at 685-88.
385. See 122 F.3d 758, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1997). Unlike the treaty in Caltagirone v. Grant, the
extradition treaty between France and the United States did not contain any language that could
be construed to require probable cause for a provisional arrest. Also, the Ninth Circuit could
only require a showing of probable cause under § 3184 for a formal extradition hearing. As a
result, the Ninth Circuit had no other alternative but to examine probable cause for a provisional
arrest under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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the Fourth Amendment, it was able to require a showing of probable
cause before a provisional arrest warrant could be issued. 38 6 The
Ninth Circuit also held that it was a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to detain an individual who was
neither a flight risk nor a threat to the community. 3 7 The Ninth Circuit en banc then failed to practice discretion and vacated the panel's
38 8
two landmark rulings in order to prove a point to an individual.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit en banc should have practiced restraint in applying the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. Realizing
that the panel opinion had established two watershed rulings in the
law of extradition, the government deserved judicial review concerning the constitutional issues. 38 9 The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine
should not have applied because there was no connection between
Parretti's fugitive status and the appellate process. 390 In response to
the government's appeal of the panel's decision, both attorneys submitted briefs on behalf of their clients. 391 Any decision that the Ninth
Circuit would have then rendered could have been enforced during
future provisional arrests, even Parretti's. 392 Therefore, by not using
the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine the Ninth Circuit could have
393
provided an effective review of the government's appeal.
The panel opinion needed only minor modifications, which could
have been provided by the Ninth Circuit en banc. A compromise between the government's position and the panel opinion concerning the
requirement of probable cause could have been reached. The government feared that by requiring a showing of probable cause for a provisional arrest two problems would arise. First, the formal extradition
hearing would become a worthless proceeding if all the evidence were
presented to obtain a provisional arrest warrant. Second, foreign relations between the United States and its treaty partners would falter if
the government were unable to reliably apprehend an individual due
to the requirement of probable cause.
A solution would be to continue to require a showing of probable
cause for a provisional arrest warrant. However, the scope of the
386. See id. at 770-76.
387. See id. at 776-81.
388. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 510-11 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
389. See id.
390. See id. at 512-13 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
391. See id. at 511-13.
392. See id. at 512.
393. The dissent in the en banc opinion makes a strong point that neither party argued or
requested the majority to use the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. See id. at 511-13. Both sides
wanted the issue resolved.
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probable cause requirement should be more than a simple facsimile
request of a foreign nation but less than what is required for a formal
extradition hearing. The sole objective should be to provide individuals like Parretti with facts and information that they can use to effectively challenge their detainment. 394 Furthermore, the court should
continue to question the viability of Wright v. HenkeP95 after nearly a
century of time. Although it has never been expressly overruled it
seems as if the doctrine has never supplied the courts with adequate
guidance. 396 Since the time of its creation the special circumstances
doctrine has provided lower courts with confusion because they are
unable to determine what exactly constitutes a special circumstance
for bail. 397 No clear guidelines have been established as to what constitutes a special circumstance because the lower courts continue to
disagree over similar fact patterns. 398 Therefore, the judiciary should
focus more upon the defendant's probability of flight and his or her
danger to the community rather than the arcane special circumstances
doctrine for the determination of bail.
IV.

IMPACT

After the panel issued its opinion, many within the government believed that there would be major changes in how the United States
practiced international extradition. 3 99 In fact, it was believed that the
case "could force the Government to renegotiate most of its international extradition treaties and abandon its century-old practices for
arresting and detaining fugitives found in the United States. '400 Many
experts also predicted that the opinion would eventually land in the
401
hands of the Supreme Court to resolve the constitutional issues.
However, due to the Ninth Circuit's application of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, the watershed holding of the panel opinion was
vacated. On October 5, 1998, the Supreme Court denied the petition
40 2
for writ of certiorari.
394. This could be as effective as a probable cause hearing that is required by County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin. See 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (holding that a prompt hearing depends upon a
number of factors including judicial resources, holidays, and the amount of crime).
395. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
396. See supra notes 191-226 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 191-226 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 191-226 and accompanying text.
399. See Lis Wiehl, Court Case Challenges U.S. Practices In Extradition, N.Y. TIMFS, Dec. 22,
1997, at A23.
400. Id.
401. See id.

402. See Parretti v. United States, 525 U.S. 877 (1998).
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Consequently, the en banc decision has left lawyers for both the
government and defendants in a state of uncertainty. Neither party
truly understands the requirements to obtain a valid provisional arrest
warrant in a case of foreign extradition. Therefore, the government
continues to detain individuals through a provisional arrest when requested by another country. Furthermore, the government continues
to offer facsimile from foreign governments and affidavits of the
AUSA to satisfy any requirements of probable cause that a magistrate
may require.
The government justifies its lack of information to support a provisional arrest warrant based on the belief that it needs to apprehend
individuals immediately. According to the government, if it is required to wait for a foreign country to gather, translate, and transfer
information, it will be unable to satisfy its obligations under foreign
extradition treaties. 40 3 However, the government's justification for
the lack of probable cause has lost some of its support due to the
technological advances of today's society. According to journalist Peter Truell, "[b]ecause of technological advances in international police
work-chiefly the explosive growth in computer data bases and the
lighting-fast transmission of photos" it has become more difficult for a
fugitive to hide from authorities. 40 4 Therefore, the burden of probable cause really should not affect the efficiency of the government's
apprehension of individuals.
Rather than review the decision of the panel opinion, the Ninth Circuit chose to apply the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine and vacate
its opinion. The court lost a chance to establish a landmark decision
worthy of the Supreme Court's review. Instead, the case has lost its
impact on the law of extradition and has now become another opinion
for the authority of the judiciary to dismiss an appeal based on an
individual's fugitive status. In fact, the first case to cite the en banc
the
opinion was United States v. King,40 5 in which the court applied
40 6
Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine to dismiss a fugitive's appeal.
The provisional arrest can be a very dangerous tool when used by
the government. It offers the government the ability to detain an individual for months while it gathers enough evidence to succeed at a
403. See Wiehl, Extradition Law, supra note 371, at 780-84.
404. Peter Truell, Fugitive Financiers Find Fewer Havens After The Initial Flight, They Can
Hide But Can't Run Again So Easily, Police Say, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 17, 1997, at B6. Truell
further states: "The authorities say that no fugitive is ever really safe in an age when the nextdoor neighbour or the kid down the block can be the kind of vigilant citizen who regularly
checks out the U.S. Justice Department's wanted list on the World Wide Web."

405. 162 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
406. See id.

Id.
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formal extradition hearing. The panel opinion countered the government's power and leveled the playing field for individuals like Parretti,
and forced the government to provide enough information to issue a
warrant. The panel opinion protected foreigners and United States
citizens alike from unjust detention. It offered individuals of foreign
extradition the ability to be free from seizure without a showing of
probable cause-a right similar to that enjoyed in the United States.
The en banc opinion destroyed this protection and has returned the
provisional arrest to the government as a dangerous tool of detention.
V.

CONCLUSION

The world has existed without complete anarchy because of the
ability of each society to maintain social order to some degree. Since
the early times of Rome and Egypt, extradition law has provided governments with the power to accomplish social order. As society has
continued to develop it has become easier for individuals to escape
prosecution of crimes committed in their homeland. However, governments have also been able to create treaties with each other and
develop technology in order to limit the ability of criminals to escape
justice. Consequently, rules are required to prevent governments
from possessing too much power and infringing upon individual rights.
The decision of Parretti v. United States is a perfect example of a
wasted opportunity for the Ninth Circuit to offer order to an area of
law that has been in disarray. Its effect has been to leave both the
government and defendants in a state of confusion concerning the requirements for a provisional arrest. Its impact will range from foreign
businessmen such as Giancarlo Parretti to regular United States citizens like Robert Henry Russell.
Angelo M. Russo

